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COMMENTS
THE PROPER INTERPLAY OF THE VOLUNTARY
DEPARTURE AND MOTION TO REOPEN
PROVISIONS OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT
Michael P. Bracken'
The United States' identity as the great melting pot' has been built by a• • 2
steady stream of immigrants. While the first Congress enacted laws for
naturalization,3 the government waited almost a hundred years to begin
restricting voluntary immigration. In 1952, Congress passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), also known as the McCarran-
Walter Act.' This became the central immigration statute for the United
States. Since its enactment there have been several significant
* Michael P. Bracken received his B.A. at the University of Virginia, 2005 and is a J.D.
candidate at Catholic University, Columbus School of Law School, 2008.
1. Molly Hazel Sutter, Note, Mixed-Status Families and Broken Homes: The Clash
Between the U.S. Hardship Standard in Cancellation of Removal Proceedings and
International Law, 15 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 783, 799 (2006).
2. See Chelsea Walsh, Note, Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial
Review, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2857, 2859-60 (2005).
3. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
4. See Won Kidane, Committing a Crime While a Refugee: Rethinking the Issue of
Deportation in Light of the Principle Against Double Jeopardy, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
383, 387 (2007) ("By 1875, however, a combination of social and economic conditions
prompted Congress to enact the first systematic national immigration act ever."). Other
such acts followed. E.g., Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(b), 43 Stat. 153, 159
(restricting immigration to an "annual quota of any nationality ... [at] the same ratio to
150,000 as the number of inhabitants in [the] continental United States in 1920 having that
national origin"), repealed by Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub.
L. No. 82-414, § 403(a)(23), 66 Stat. 163, 279 (1952); see also BUREAU OF FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1929, at 102 (1929) (displaying immigration quotas for 1925-1927 by
country).
5. Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §§
1101-1537 (2000)); Walsh, supra note 2, at 2862 (noting that the INA "'consolidated
previous immigration laws into one [coordinated] statute"' and that it "replaced all earlier
immigration laws but has been amended frequently since its inception") (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 56 (3d ed. 1995)).
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amendments,6 including the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996.7
Congress passed the IIRIRA to improve certain aspects of the INA,"
specifically it amended both the voluntary departure and motion to
reopen sections of the INA.9 The IIRIRA established time limits for
both sections, thereby making the rules that guide them much stricter.' °
Voluntary departure and motions to reopen are key procedural
components in removing an illegal alien from the United States." When
an alien is brought before an immigration judge (IJ) for removal
proceedings, the IJ is allowed to grant the alien up to 120 days to
voluntarily depart from the United States, rather than having U.S.
officials forcefully remove him." If voluntary departure is granted and
the alien abides, then he or she receives certain privileges not given to
those that are forcefully removed.13 However, if the alien does not
voluntarily depart when the privilege is granted (a privilege which he
must request during his hearing), certain penalties apply. 14 The Board of
6. E.g., Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.);
Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (eliminating national quotas) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
7. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. titles 8 and 18).
8. Sutter, supra note 1, at 806 (noting that the IIRIRA was passed in response to
public concern "over the increasing number of illegal immigrants coming into the United
States").
9. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7) (West 2005) (motions to reopen); id. § 1229c (West
2005 & Supp. 2007) (voluntary departure).
10. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), 1229c(b)(2) (West 2005).
11. See Walsh, supra note 2, at 2866 (summarizing deportation procedures). As
Walsh explained:
The filing of a notice to appear begins the removal process. The notice to
appear informs the alien of "the nature of the proceedings," the factual
allegations underlying the charge of deportability, and the "statutory provisions
alleged to have been violated." The IJ [immigration judge] decides whether the
alien is deportable and, if so, whether he is eligible for a discretionary relief
measure. The IJ is bound by a substantial evidence standard at the hearing. If
the alien is found deportable, the final order may then be appealed to the BIA
[Board of Immigration Appeals]. Upon a determination of the BIA, the case
may be appealed to a federal court.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)).
12. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(a)(2), (b)(2).
13. Walsh, supra note 2, at 2868-70 (stating that the most important benefit is that the
alien can apply for a readjustment of his status immediately and also avoid other penalties,
such as monetary fines, that a deportee normally incurs).
14. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007) (providing that an alien who has
been permitted to depart voluntarily, but refuses to depart, "(A) shall be subject to a civil
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) 5 has decided that one such consequence is
that an alien loses his opportunity to pursue a motion to reopen.16
Through a motion to reopen, an alien "seeks fresh consideration [of his
status] on the basis of newly discovered facts or a change in
circumstances since the hearing, or solicits an opportunity to apply for
discretionary relief."' 7 An alien who loses a removal hearing and a
subsequent appeal is permitted to file a single motion to reopen.18
However, if an alien voluntarily departs, his motion to reopen is
considered automatically rescinded. 9 Therefore, a conundrum exists
because the BIA has ruled that if an alien does not leave within his
allotted voluntary departure timeY2 he gives up his right to reopen;2' yet,
if he does depart, his right to reopen is automatically lost." Therefore,
the motion to reopen is effectively unavailable to an alien who is granted
voluntary departure.23
penalty of not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000; and (B) shall be ineligible, for a
period of 10 years, to receive any further relief under this section and sections 1229b, 1255,
1258, and 1259 of this title").
15. The BIA is the appellate court for immigration hearings. The majority of
voluntary departure decisions ruled on by immigration judges are subsequently appealed
to the BIA. The BIA is also responsible for ruling on the majority of the motion to
reopen appeals. 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05[1]-[3] (rev. ed. 2007).
16. Cf Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 2005) (relating
circumstances of the Azartes' failure to voluntarily depart during the pendency of their
motion to reopen, and the BIA's summary dismissal of the motion).
17. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 15, § 3.05[7][a].
18. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7) (West 2005).
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2007) (governing procedures before the BIA). The
relevant provision reads:
A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf
of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings
subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from
the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the
subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the
filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a
withdrawal of such motion.
Id. § 1003.2(d). The BIA has interpreted this regulation to mean that if an alien
voluntarily departs, his motion to reopen is effectively lost. E.g., Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281-
82.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that aliens may be granted up to 120
days to voluntarily depart).
21. E.g., Shaar, 21 I. & N. Dec. 541, 548-49 (1996) (interim decision) (finding that the
appropriate regulations may force an alien granted voluntary departure "to depart the
United States while a motion [to reopen] is pending"), affd sub nom. Shaar v. INS, 141
F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1998).
22. See § 1003.2(d).
23. See, e.g., Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282.
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This conundrum has made its way to the U.S. circuit courts, seven of
which have weighed in on the matter.14 The Ninth Circuit was the first to
address the issue in Azarte v. Ashcroft, where it overruled the BIA's
decision and held that it would be contrary to Congress' intent not to toll
the voluntary departure time while a motion to reopen is pending.2 The
Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have since adopted this position. 6
On the other side, the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have taken a
drastically different approach to the proper interrelationship of these two
statutory provisions by refusing to toll the voluntary departure period,
thus creating a circuit split.
27
This Comment begins by discussing the development of the voluntary
departure and motion to reopen provisions in U.S. immigration law. The
Comment then explores the circuit split on whether the voluntary
departure period should be tolled while a motion to reopen is pending.
Next, the Comment analyzes the statutory interpretation methods the
circuit courts have applied in their attempts to construct the proper
interpretation of the two provisions. Finally, this Comment argues in
favor of a recently proposed Department of Justice rule providing that a
grant of voluntary departure would automatically terminate if a motion
to reopen is filed. The proposed rule is consistent with the language of
the statute, and still obtains a reasonable and just result for aliens.
I. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES AND
MOTIONS TO REOPEN
A. The History and Development of the Motion to Reopen
Motions to reopen and voluntary departures are two concepts that
have been a part of U.S. immigration law since the early twentieth
century.2 Evidence of the Immigration Bureau applying the concept of a
24. Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2007); Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459
F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007) (No.
06-1285); Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006); Banda-Ortiz v.
Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007); Kanivets v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2005); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950 (8th Cir.
2005) (per curiam); A zarte, 394 F.3d 1278.
25. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286-89.
26. Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1330-31; Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 335-36; Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d
at 952.
27. Chedad, 497 F.3d at 62-65; Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 505-07; Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d
at 389-91.
28. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283-84; David S. Rubenstein, Restoring the Quid Pro
Quo of Voluntary Departure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10 (2007) ("The voluntary
departure program was formally introduced to the law in 1940."); S. Anthony Silva,
Comment, Immigration - Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales: The Fifth Circuit Refuses to
Automatically Toll Voluntary Departure While a Motion to Reopen is Pending, Creating
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motion to reopen can be found as early as 1916.29 The purpose of a
motion to reopen has remained the same since that time: to provide an
alien with the opportunity to offer new evidence to immigration
authorities that is particularly relevant to a previous decision made by
the same authority. 3°  Originally found in the form of regulations,
motions to reopen had no statutory guidelines regarding time limits and
the number of motions permitted." In 1996, however, after a debate on
whether aliens were abusing motions to reopen, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) published a final rule requiring that any motion to reopen
"must be filed not later than 90 days after the date on which the final
administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be
reopened., 2 That same year, Congress codified motions to reopen when
it passed the IIRIRA, thereby changing the procedure from "a
regulatory to a statutory form of relief."33 The new motion to reopen
provision codified the DOJ's ninety-day time limit and restricted an alien
to a single motion.34 The new provisions of the IIRIRA greatly limited
an alien's ability to appeal removal rulings when relevant new
New Hazards for Alien and Practitioner Alike, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 429, 433 (2007)
("Similar to voluntary departure, the motion to reopen is also a creature of historical
development, with origins in the case law from the early twentieth century.").
29. See, e.g., Silva, supra note 28, at 433 n.17 (citing Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579
(N.D. Cal. 1916)).
30. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283. A motion to reopen will be unsuccessful, unless the
alien can show that the
new evidence is material and could not have been discovered and presented at
the former hearing. This restriction is equally binding on [the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)] and the noncitizen. There is also an implicit
requirement that the facts alleged would be sufficient, if proved, to change the
result. Motions to reopen for the purpose of applying for discretionary relief will
not be granted if the respondent had a full opportunity to apply for such relief at
the former hearing unless the relief is sought on the basis of subsequent
circumstances.
1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 15, § 3.05[7][a] (footnotes omitted).
Motions to reopen have been compared to motions for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. White v. INS, 6
F.3d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1993).
31. Silva, supra note 28, at 433-34 ("In 1941, the Attorney General, through the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ('INS'), included the motion to reopen in the
federal regulations, one year after the statutory voluntary departure provisions were
codified in the Alien Registration Act of 1940."); see also Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283.
32. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1997) (current version at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2007)); see
also Silva, supra note 28, at 434.
33. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1283.
34. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); Silva, supra note 28, at 434.
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information has arisen regarding his status; it also restricted the
discretion of the BIA to hear such appeals.35
B. The Development of Voluntary Departure in
American Immigration Law
In addition to the motion to reopen provision the IIRIRA also altered
the voluntary departure provision." Voluntary departure, like the
motion to reopen, was a concept originally addressed early in the
twentieth century.37 The goal of the voluntary departure scheme is to
reduce "the costs associated with deporting individuals from the United
States and [to] provid[e] a mechanism for illegal aliens to leave the
country without being subject to the stigma or bars to future relief that
are part of the sanction of deportation. ,38 The first statutory basis for
voluntary departure was the Alien Registration Act,39 which was later
included in the INA.4 Under the INA, this provision had no time limit;
however in practice, the INS granted voluntary departure periods of up
41to a year or more.
As with the motion to reopen, the IIRIRA changed the INA's
voluntary departure provision by restricting its application. The
voluntary departure period, as set out in the IIRIRA, cannot exceed 120
days if granted before the end of a proceeding, or sixty days if granted atthe oncusio ofa • 42
the conclusion of a proceeding. In general, these time limits have been
strictly adhered to, and in fact, there is a separate provision which
specifically prevents these voluntary departure dates from being
35. See § 1003.2(c); see also Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences:
IIRIRA and Other Unsung Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55
CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 940-45 (2006) (describing the effect of the IIRIRA specifically on
the BIA and IJs); Jill M. Pfenning, Inadequate and Ineffective: Congress Suspends the Writ
of Habeas Corpus for Noncitizens Challenging Removal Orders by Failing to Provide a
Way to Introduce New Evidence, 31 VT. L. REV. 735, 743-44 (2007) (describing generally
the changes the IIRIRA has had on the review of immigration cases).
36. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); see also Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1284-85
(characterizing the IIRIRA as having effected "drastic[]" change).
37. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1284. The first recorded referral to this concept was in 1923.
United States ex rel. Patton v. Tod, 292 F. 243,244 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (noting that due to the
conditions of World War I, an alien was granted "temporary admission under a bond for a
period of one year, [with] voluntary departure to be effected sooner if so directed").
38. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1284.
39. Alien Registration Act, 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672; see also Silva, supra
note 28, at 432 & n.11.
40. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 244,
66 Stat. 163, 214-17 (1952); see also Silva, supra note 28, at 432.
41. See Rubenstein, supra note 28, at 11.
42. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(a)(2)(A), (b)(2) (2000).
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extended.43  The IIRIRA also lists specific requirements that an alien
must meet before he can be granted voluntary departure, so that only a
certain number of good standing aliens are eligible for such relief.4
If an alien does not voluntarily depart during the time period allotted,
he is subject to serious consequences.4'5 However, voluntary departure is
a great benefit to the alien who satisfies the requirements listed in the
INA because it allows a noncitizen to leave the United States with almost
no consequences even though the alien violated the law by remaining in
the country illegally.4
C. The Interrelationship of the Motion to Reopen and Voluntary
Departure Provisions
The motion to reopen and voluntary departure provisions are both
relevant in a procedural discussion of the removal of aliens from the U.S.
Neither provision mentions the other; therefore, it is not clear how
Congress intended the two to interact.47  There have been, and will
continue to be, many instances where these two provisions overlap. The
obvious example arises when an alien is granted a voluntary departure
period of sixty days, files a motion to reopen within those sixty days, and
then that motion remains pending when the sixty-day period expires."
43. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2007) ("In no event can the total period of a time,
including any extension, exceed 120 days or 60 days .... ").
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1) (2000). Requirements for voluntary departure include
physical presence in the U.S. for at least the preceding year; good moral character for at
least the preceding five years; the absence of triggering deportability conditions, such as
the commission of an aggravated felony or other security grounds; and the means and
intent to depart the U.S., as shown by clear and convincing evidence. See id. §
1229c(b)(1)(A)-(D).
45. The three primary consequences for an alien who does not leave within the
voluntary departure time allotted are: first, the forfeiture of a bond that the alien must
post when voluntary departure is granted, which is meant to encourage aliens to leave the
country within the time given, id. § 1229c(a)(3); second, a fine of no less than $1000 but no
more than $5000, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2007); and third, the alien will
be ineligible for a period of ten years to apply for any regularization of their illegal status
in the United States, id. § 1229c(d)(1)(B). The third consequence is arguably the harshest,
because the alien cannot return to the country with a legal status, even temporarily, during
the ten-year period.
46. See Rubenstein, supra note 28, at 2. The main consequence avoided through
voluntary departure is bypassing removal proceedings and the punishments that
accompany such proceedings, including "an order of removal and the attendant bars to
readmission into the United States that would otherwise attach if the alien were removed
by the Government." Id.
47. See Silva, supra note 28, at 431-32.
48. Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the alien's motion to reopen failed because the alien did not depart voluntarily from the
country as directed); Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2006) (same),
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The INA, as amended by the IIRIRA, does not cover this situation
because it treats the two provisions separately.49
In 1997, the DOJ offered some preliminary advice in an interim rule
discussing this interplay between voluntary departure and motions to
reopen, but notably has refused to issue a final rule.5 ° The DOJ
considered "three possible options: no tolling of any period of voluntary
departure; tolling the voluntary departure period for any period that an
appeal or motion is pending; or setting a brief, fixed period of voluntary
departure (for example, 10 days) after any appeal or motion is
resolved.""1 No final DOJ or Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
regulations regarding a stay of the voluntary departure period were ever
promulgated." However, in November 2007, the DOJ published a
proposed rule in the Federal Register that directly responds to the
current circuit split. 3 This proposed rule provides that if an alien has
been granted voluntary departure and before that period expires the
alien files a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, that filing will
have the effect of terminating the grant of voluntary departure 4 This
rule, if promulgated, would solve this statutory conflict and put an end to
the circuit split. This is only a proposed rule, however, and currently the
DOJ and its IJs continue to follow the rule that if an alien stays in the
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same).
49. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a), with id. § 1229c(c); see also Katherine A. Tapley,
Recent Development, Automatic Tolling of the Voluntary Departure Period-A Circuit
Split, 39 ST. MARY'S L.J. 185, 194-95 (2007) (discussing this statutory conflict).
50. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,325-26
(proposed Mar. 6, 1997); see also Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 3, Dada v. Gonzales, No. 06-1181 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2007) (stating that although the DOJ
asserted that it would issue regulations on tolling, "no such regulations were ever issued").
51. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. at 10,326.
52. Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195,1205-06 (9th Cir. 2005).
53. Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition
for Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,674 (proposed Nov. 30, 2007).
54. Id. at 67,674. The proposed regulation helps to solve the circuit split by
automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure if a motion to reopen is filed
before the period for voluntary departure has expired.
This proposed rule would amend the Department of Justice .. . regulations
regarding voluntary departure to allow an alien to elect to file a motion to
reopen or reconsider, but also to provide that the alien's filing of a motion to
reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of the voluntary departure period
will have the effect of automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure
.... If the alien elects to seek further review and forgo voluntary departure, the
alien will be subject to the alternate order of removal that was issued in
conjunction with the grant of voluntary departure, similar to other aliens who
were found to be removable. But this approach also means he or she will not be
subject to the penalties for failure to depart voluntarily.
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U.S. past his period for voluntary departure he forfeits his pending
motion to reopen and loses the benefits he would have received by
departing voluntarily.55
Procedurally, it is the immigration judges of the DOJ's internal
division of the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR),
including those Js who sit on the BIA, who are in charge of deciding the
proper interplay between voluntary departure and motions to reopen."
The Js make the initial ruling and set the period for voluntary
departure.5 7 Then, if that decision is appealed, the BIA makes its ruling
58
and may extend the voluntary departure period by another thirty days.
If a motion to reopen is filed, it is the BIA that normally grants or denies
the motion after hearing the new evidence. 9 Based on these duties, it is
sensible to look to the BIA's interpretation to determine how these two
provisions should interrelate.
The BIA has interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 to mean that if an alien
does depart voluntarily, he forfeits any motions to reconsider or reopen,
and there has been no significant debate about this interpretation.
0
Therefore, any pending motions are immediately discarded. 6' However,
the question remains as to whether the voluntary departure period
should be automatically tolled while a motion to reopen is pending if the
62
alien chooses to stay in the country.
55. See Dada v. Gonzales, 207 F. App'x 425, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing how
"[t]he BIA denied Dada's motion to reopen on the ground that, because he failed to leave
the United States by the imposed deadline for voluntary departure, he was statutorily
ineligible for adjustment of status, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)"); see also supra notes
22-23, 49 and accompanying text.
56. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26 (2007) (describing BIA and IJ judicial discretion); 1 GORDON,
MAILMAN, & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 15, § 3.04 (describing the EOIR); Rubenstein,
supra note 28, at 5 (describing the EOIR as a "quasi-judicial agency" within the DOJ,
which "operate[s] independently of the INS").
57. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2000).
58. See, e.g., Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007); Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir. 2005).
59. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 15, § 3.05[6][a].
60. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
61. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).
62. See Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006)
(discussing the issue and noting the existence of the circuit split). On September 25, 2007,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dada v. Mukasey, a case appealed from the Fifth
Circuit that deals with the proper interrelationship of the voluntary departure and motion
to reopen provisions. Dada v. Gonzales, 207 F. App'x 425, (5th Cir. 2006), cert. granted
sub nom. Dada v. Keisler, 128 S. Ct. 36 (Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-1181), argued sub nom.
Dada v. Mukasey, No. 06-1181 (Jan. 8, 2008). The facts of Dada v. Mukasey are a bit
different than Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales because in Dada the alien specifically requested a
withdrawal of his voluntary departure before it had expired. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 11, Dada v. Gonzales, No. 06-1181 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2007). The BIA refused
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The BIA's stance on the proper interplay of voluntary departure and
motions to reopen has remained constant for over a decade. 3 In fact, its
stance was the same when the motions to reopen were only in regulatory
form and the voluntary departure provision was codified in the INA.
4
Shaar is the most often-cited BIA case addressing this issue. 65 Although
the ruling relies on the earlier INA provision for voluntary departure,
which has since been updated in the IIRIRA, as well as an uncodified
motion to reopen regulation, the current language of the two provisions
in the IIRIRA has changed minimally. 6 The BIA's decision in Shaar set
the precedent that an alien who fails to depart within the granted
voluntary departure period is "statutorily ineligible for suspension of
deportation., 67  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA's
reasoning.6' Therefore, until recently, the courts and the BIA agreed that
if an alien remained in the United States after the date set for voluntary
that request (which the Fifth Circuit upheld) and then subsequently deemed that the relief
requested in Dada's motion to reopen was unavailable since he had stayed past his
voluntary departure period. Id. at 10-12. The Court has a chance with its decision on this
case to resolve the circuit split that is centered on the proper interplay of the voluntary
departure and motion to reopen provisions.
63. Compare Shaar, 21 1. & N. Dec. 541, 548-49 (1996) (interim decision) ("[A]
deportable alien must leave the United States within the time of voluntary departure...
absent very limited exceptional circumstances."), affd sub nom. Shaar v. INS, 141 F.3d
953 (9th Cir. 1998), with Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391 ("The BIA has reasonably
interpreted the governing statutes ... to permit the filing and resolution of a motion to
reopen, so long as it does not interfere with the ... voluntary departure date ...."), and
Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281 ("Under the BIA's current interpretation ..... if an alien departs
within his voluntary departure period, he forfeits any motion to reopen ... because he is
no longer within the United States.").
64. See Shaar, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 548-49; Silva, supra note 28, at 435 & n.32, 436 &
n.35 (collecting prior, consistent BIA holdings).
65. See, e.g., Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 505 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007) (No. 06-1285); Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1327;
Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286-87.
66. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(2) (1994) (repealed 1996) ("[A]ny alien allowed to
depart voluntarily ...who remains in the United States after the scheduled date of
departure ... shall not be eligible for relief ... for a period of 5 years after the scheduled
date of departure...."), with 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(a) (2000) (providing a period of 120 days
for voluntary departure prior to the completion of deportation proceedings), and id. §
1229c(b) (providing a period of 60 days for voluntary departure after the conclusion of
deportation proceedings). The biggest difference among these statutes is the time limits
added to the latter two provisions.
67. See Shaar, 21 . & N. Dec. at 549.
68. See Shaar, 141 F.3d at 956 ("We find no fault with [the BIA's] reading of the
statute, for that is what the statute plainly says."). It is important to note that the Ninth
Circuit's holding here was based on the INA before the enactment of the IIRIRA, which
made specific changes to these provisions, most notably by adding strict time limits. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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departure, the alien could not obtain relief unless exceptional
circumstances existed.69
The language of the IIRIRA has modified the voluntary departure and
motion to reopen provisions slightly, mostly by adding strict time limits7 0
Even with these changes introduced by the IIRIRA, the BIA has
consistently interpreted how these two provisions should interact in
immigration law.71 The BIA continues to hold that if an alien voluntarily
departs within the time period allotted, he forfeits all pending motions
because he is no longer in the United States." Additionally, the BIA
strictly holds that if an alien remains in the country beyond the period
granted for voluntary departure, the alien is no longer eligible for the
relief requested with a motion to reopen, and is precluded for ten years
from seeking such relief.73 It is this latter interpretation that has caused
the most controversy among the circuit courts.
D. The Circuit Courts' Insight on the Proper Relationship of Voluntary
Departure and Motions to Reopen
The Ninth Circuit, the same court that affirmed the BIA's ruling in
Shaar, has taken the lead role in challenging the BIA's interpretation
regarding the interplay between the voluntary departure and motion to
reopen provisions.74 In Azarte v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit was the first
to rule on the issue of what happens under the new IIRIRA standards to
a pending motion to reopen after a voluntary departure period expires."
69. Rubenstein, supra note 28, at 12 ("[A]n alien who was granted voluntary
departure but failed to secure a sufficient departure period from the BIA ... was faced
with having to choose between (1) voluntarily departing or (2) appealing a removal order
at the risk of losing the benefits of voluntary departure."). Exceptional circumstances did
not include motions to reopen, and therefore relief was not available to an alien if he
remained in the country after the voluntary departure period expired. Shaar, 21 1. & N.
Dec. at 544; see also id. at 544-45 (holding that the IJ's inability to hear motions before the
voluntary period has expired cannot be seen as an exceptional or unusual circumstance
given the "heavy caseload" of IJs). But see Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th Cir.
2007) (criticizing the "[riepeated egregious failures of the Immigration Court").
70. See supra notes 34, 42 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 63.
72. E.g., Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir. 2007); Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at
504; Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1330; Banda-Oniz, 445 F.3d at 391; Barroso v. Gonzales, 429
F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005); Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2005);
Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Azarte, 394 F.3d at
1281; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2007) (providing that if the alien is no longer in the
United States, then he is no longer eligible for the relief that a motion to reopen provides).
73. See Chedad, 497 F.3d at 61; Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282 & n.2.
74. See Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 504 (discussing Azarte's influence on sister circuits);
Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1329-30 (same).
75. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1287 ("[W]e must interpret the new IIRIRA provisions in the
first instance.").
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76Azarte was a typical deportation case. The Azartes, natives of
Mexico, lost their removal hearing and their subsequent appeal to the
BIA, and were ordered to leave the country." Despite the outcome of
the hearing, their request for voluntary departure was granted.78 Seven
days before their time to voluntarily depart expired, the Azartes timely
filed a motion to reopen with the BIA. 79  The motion offered new
information about their family's status in an attempt to show an
exceptional need to stay in the country."° The BIA, after a six-month
delay, held that because the Azartes had stayed past their voluntary
departure period, they were ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 The
Azartes then timely filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.82
The Ninth Circuit repudiated the BIA's interpretation of the
interrelationship of these two provisions, holding that the BIA's
76. 394 F.3d 1278. Salvadore Azarte and Celia Castellon, of Mexico, illegally entered
the United States in 1987. They stayed in California, where they got married and had two
children. Id. at 1280. In April 1997, the INS began removal hearings against the couple,
charging that they were in the United States illegally. Id. The Azartes conceded their
removability, but requested that their removal be cancelled, or in the alternative, that they
be granted voluntary departure. In April 1999, the IJ denied their cancellation of removal
request because the Azartes had not shown that exceptional or extreme hardship would
result if they were forced to leave the United States. Id. The Azartes appealed the
decision. On April 23, 2002, the BIA affirmed, and allowed the Azartes an additional
thirty days to voluntarily depart. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 1280-81. Along with the motion to reopen, the Azartes also requested a
stay of deportation. This is notable because the court did not completely answer the
question of whether the voluntary departure period is automatically tolled while a motion
to reopen is pending. See id. at 1288 n.20. Instead, the Ninth Circuit stated that it would
not address the issue because the Azartes had requested a stay of removal; the court then
inferred that this request also implied a request for a stay of their voluntary departure
period. Id. However, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit, in Barroso v. Gonzales, held that the
voluntary departure period should be automatically tolled whether or not a request to stay
deportation (or voluntary departure) is made. See Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195,
1207 (9th Cir. 2005).
80. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281. The new information concerned the mental and
physical health of the Azartes' son. He had been diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), had "inadequate control over his bodily functions," and
suffered from anxiety and depression. Id. When the Azartes filed their motion to reopen,
they offered this new evidence to the BIA, "hop[ing] that this information would persuade
the BIA that their departure from the United States would constitute an exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship for their American-citizen son." Id. The Azartes stated that
they depended on medical insurance from Mr. Azarte's job to pay for their son's
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interpretation had drastic negative consequences that were unintended
by Congress." The BIA rarely hears a motion to reopen within sixty
days of its being filed.84 Therefore, no realistic opportunity exists for an
alien who has been granted voluntary departure to use his statutory right
to a motion to reopen the deportation hearing." The Azartes faced a no-
win situation because of the BIA's reading of these two provisions.6
Regardless of the new information that may have changed their position
as illegal aliens, if the Azartes left within their voluntary departure
period, they would forfeit any right to a reopening of their case.87 On the
other hand, if they stayed beyond the time allotted in the grant of
voluntary departure, the Azartes would forfeit any pending motion to
reopen. From this, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress could not
have intended such a result when it codified these two provisions in the
IRIRA in 1996.89
Holding that the BIA's interpretation was erroneous, the court
attempted to offer its own statutory interpretation of the two
provisions.'o The court began by stating that deference to the view of an
administrative agency is not necessary when "'normal principles of
statutory construction suffice"' to determine the statute's meaning.9 The
Ninth Circuit pointed out that this concept is especially true when the
83. Id. at 1281-82; see also Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1207-08 (affirming Azarte).
84. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282 ("[T]he BIA rarely if ever rules on a motion to reopen
before an alien's voluntary departure period has expired .... "); see also Press Release,
Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration
Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002) (describing the "massive backlog of pending cases"
and referring to the BIA as "a bottleneck in the system"), available at http://www.
usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02_eoir_489.htm.
85. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1282 ("[T]he interpretation serves to deprive aliens who are
afforded voluntary departure of their statutory right to a determination on the merits of
motions to reopen."); see also Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2005).
86. See Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334 (calling the situation a "'Catch-22"').
87. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281 ("[I]f an alien departs within his voluntary departure
period, he forfeits any motion to reopen he may have filed because he is no longer within
the United States." (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2004))); see also Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334
("[I]f the alien leaves the country within the period allowed for voluntary departure, he
forfeits his motion to reopen." (citing § 1003.2(d))).
88. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281-82; see also Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334-35 ("Under the
BIA ruling, the result is that an alien who does not leave the United States within the time
specified in the grant of voluntary departure is not entitled to adjustment of status....
Before enactment of the statute, the practice had been to extend voluntary departure
freely so that the BIA would have time to rule on reopening before the alien would have
been required to depart.").
89. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286-89.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1285 (quoting Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783, 786 (9th Cir.
2004)).
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agency's interpretation leads to an "absurd result." 92  Therefore, the
court discarded the principle (enunciated in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.) that deference is owed to agency
interpretations. 93 Rather, the Ninth Circuit looked to other canons of
statutory construction, primarily using the language of the statute itself to
determine Congress' intent.94 The court determined that "[w]ith respect
to motions to reopen and voluntary departure, Congress' language in
IIRIRA is clear and unambiguous. '" 95 Further, the court held that
Congress intended to give aliens both the opportunity to file motions to
reopen and to request voluntary departure.96 Thus, the court refused to
believe that Congress would enact the motion to reopen statute without
any mention of a voluntary departure exception and yet not intend that it
apply to the "significant" number of aliens who are granted voluntary
departure.
97
Although the Ninth Circuit had ruled in Shaar that an alien's voluntary
departure period is not tolled when a motion to reopen is pending, the
Azarte court held that because the IIRIRA had "drastically altered ...
immigration law," these provisions required a new interpretation. 98 The
92. Id. at 1288-89.
93. Id. at 1285 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)); see also Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 389-90 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the Azarte court declined to defer to the agency interpretation of the statute), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007). Where an agency is charged with interpreting its statutory
mandate, courts will show that interpretation considerable deference so long as the
interpretation is reasonable or permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also
WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 145-49 (3d ed. 2006). Further, the Supreme Court has held
that "judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials 'exercise especially sensitive political functions that
implicate questions of foreign relations."' INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999) (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Applying the Suspension Clause to Immigration Cases, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1097
(1998) ("Under the regime of Chevron ... courts must frequently accord deference to
statutory interpretations rendered by administrative agencies ... even if the interpretation
is not the best one.").
94. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1286 ("There is no doubt that Congress intended to give the Attorney
General's designates the ability to grant voluntary departure for up to 60 days and allow
aliens to file a motion to reopen within 90 days." (footnote omitted)).
97. Id. at 1289. In 2006, however, only ten percent of deportees were granted
voluntary departure. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at Q1 (2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy06syb.pdf.
98. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1286-87 (citing Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166,
1170 (9th Cir. 2003)). The court argued that Shaar was decided at a time when motions to
reopen had no statutory basis, and therefore the interrelationship of the voluntary
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court found that the IIRIRA, with its statutory implementation of time
limits, required a departure from once-settled case law espoused in
Shaar.9
In freshly interpreting the IIRIRA, the circuit court held that it was
"obligated" to look at the statute in its entirety.'0° When applying this
form of statutory construction to the IIRIRA, both voluntary departure
and motions to reopen must have force, and neither should control the
other.'1 The current BIA reading, in the court's view, eliminated some
of the meaning of the motion to reopen by depriving all aliens granted
voluntary departure of the motion to reopen as a form of relief.' The
Ninth Circuit believed that under a better interpretation, the voluntary
departure period would be tolled if a motion to reopen is filed before the
departure period expires.' °3 According to the court, this would allow
both provisions to have force without one negating or controlling the
other. °4 The court also contended that this interpretation would satisfy
the canon of statutory construction prohibiting any interpretation leading
to absurd results.'5 Further, it would be "absurd to conclude that
Congress 'intended to allow motions to reopen to be filed but not
heard..'' ' °6  Finally, the court observed that the tolling of voluntary
departure periods would also satisfy the oft-applied canon that
departure and motion to reopen provisions could not be analyzed and applied in the same
manner today. Id. at 1286. Additionally, when Shaar was decided, through frequent
extensions, aliens were normally given as long as one year for voluntary departure, making
it much more realistic that a motion to reopen would be considered and ruled on before
they had to leave. Id. at 1286-87.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1287-88. Another similar rule of statutory construction states that various
provisions within a statute should be interpreted in a complementary fashion. See
Citizens' Util. Ratepayer Bd. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 956 P.2d 685, 703 (Kan. 1998)
(holding that a fundamental rule of statutory construction is that "[c]ourts must 'construe
all provisions of statutes in pari materia with a view of reconciling and bringing them into
workable harmony, if reasonably possible to do so"' (quoting Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas Co.
v. State Corp. Comm'n, 271 P.2d 1091, 1092 (1954))). The Ninth Circuit does not discuss
this rule of statutory interpretation, but it serves to strengthen the argument that the
voluntary departure period should be automatically tolled when a motion to reopen is
pending.
101. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1287-88.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1288.
104. Id. (discussing that this approach would be "more consistent" with the statute's
thrust, thereby "effectuat[ing] both statutory provisions").
105. Id. at 1288.
106. Id. at 1289 (quoting Shaar v. INS, 141 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 1998) (Browning, J.,
dissenting)). This supposedly absurd result would be reality if the BIA's ruling is accepted
and put into practice by the circuit courts.
Catholic University Law Review
"'deportation statutes should be construed in favor of the alien."" 7 Not
tolling the voluntary departure period would preclude many aliens from
obtaining redress when their circumstances change; therefore, the Ninth
Circuit argued that the BIA interpretation could not be correct.'O°
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the Azartes' motion to
reopen with instructions for the BIA to consider the motion on its
merits."°
Although the Ninth Circuit overruled the BIA's interpretation in
Azarte, in subsequent decisions the BIA continued to rule as it had
previously, refusing to toll the voluntary departure period when a motion
to reopen is pending) 1° As a result, other circuits began to follow in the
Ninth Circuit's footsteps in overturning the BIA's interpretation."' The
Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have now held that the BIA's
interpretation is erroneous and that voluntary departure periods should
be automatically tolled when a motion to reopen is pending.'
12
107. Id. (quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2004)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 57, 58 (1st Cir. 2007).
111. See Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2006) ("We
adopt the rule established in Azarte that the timely filing of a motion to reopen tolls the
period of voluntary departure pending the resolution of the motion to reopen."); Kanivets
v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e hold that because Kanivets timely
filed his petition for reopening, the BIA should decide his motion for reopening on the
merits."); Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) ("We
agree with the view in Azarte that Sidikhouya must be afforded an opportunity to receive
a ruling on the merits of his timely filed motion to reopen .... ").
112. See Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1329-31; Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334-36; Sidikhouya, 407
F.3d at 952. Though these three courts explicitly state that they are basing their decisions
on the reasoning set forth in Azarte, see supra note 110, a slightly different question was
posed in Azarte. There, the plaintiffs requested a stay of their voluntary departure.
Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1281. The court noted that it would not reach the question of whether
the voluntary departure period should be automatically tolled, id. at 1288 n.20, but rather
held only that it should be tolled while a motion to reopen is pending and a stay is
requested, id. at 1289. In dictum, however, the court suggested that automatically tolling
the voluntary departure period while a motion to reopen is pending "would be consistent
with the legislative scheme." Id. at 1288 n.20. Less than a year later, the Ninth Circuit
finally ruled that voluntary departure periods should be automatically tolled while a
motion to reopen is pending, regardless of whether a stay is requested. Barroso v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2005). Despite the more recent Barroso
decision, however, circuit courts continue to cite Azarte for support of automatically
tolling the voluntary departure period. See supra note 110. Therefore, this Comment will
also refer to the reasoning as "Azarte logic" when discussing whether voluntary departure
should be automatically tolled.
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The Eighth Circuit was the first to apply Azarte's reasoning in its April
2005 opinion in Sidikhouya v. Gonzales."3 The Third Circuit followed
soon after, overturning the BIA's ruling in Kanivets v. Gonzales.
4
Finally, in June 2006 the Eleventh Circuit overturned the BIA's decision
in Ugokwe v. United States Attorney General."5 These decisions not only
provide that the BIA's interpretation creates an absurd result, but have
116
relied heavily on Azarte in doing so.
E. The Creation of a Circuit Split - The Fifth Circuit Decides
Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales
By the end of 2005, it appeared that circuit by circuit, the BIA's
interpretation was slowly being discredited."7 However, the Fifth Circuit
halted this trend when, in 2006, it rejected the holding in Azarte and
attacked the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and method of statutory
113. Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 952. The plaintiff, Youssef Sidikhouya, a citizen of
Morrocco, came to the United States on a visitor's visa and never left. Id. at 951. He was
ordered to appear before an IJ in December 2001. He conceded removability and
requested voluntary departure, which was granted; his request for a continuance pending
his labor certification application, however, was denied. Id. Sidikhouya appealed to the
BIA in October 2002. He then proceeded to marry a U.S. citizen, who filed a Petition for
Alien Relative, which allows U.S. citizens to establish a relationship to an alien wishing to
immigrate to the country. Id.; see U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP'T
OF HOMELAND SEC., OMB FORM No. 1615-0012, 1-130, PETITION FOR ALIEN RELATIVE
1 (2005), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-130.pdf. The BIA affirmed the
IJ's ruling in January 2004 and Sidikhouya sought a motion to reopen in February, before
his voluntary departure period had expired. Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 951. In his motion,
he offered new evidence consisting of documents establishing his marriage to a U.S.
citizen. The next month, however, the BIA denied Sidikhouya's motion to reopen
because he had failed to leave within his voluntary departure period. Id.
114. Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 335-36. Oleg Kanivets, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, filed for
asylum on August 2, 1999, more than six months after he was to leave the U.S. Id. at 331.
He alleged that he was a victim of religious persecution, which resulted in physical
assaults, hospital stays, and unemployment. Id. at 331-32. The IJ refused him asylum but
granted him sixty days of voluntary departure. The BIA affirmed in October 2002 and
granted an additional thirty days for voluntary departure. Id. at 332. In November 2002,
Kanivets timely filed a motion to reopen based on his alien worker certification and his
employer's pending immigration petition. In July 2003, the BIA denied this motion on the
ground that Kanivets had stayed past his voluntary departure period and therefore was
ineligible for readjustment of his status. Id. at 332-33.
115. Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1330-31. In April 2004, an IJ found that Nigerian citizen
Mildred Ugokwe was illegally residing in the U.S. because she had overstayed her visa. Id.
at 1326-27. She was given until August 2004 to depart voluntarily. On July 28, 2004 she
filed a timely motion to reopen based on her marriage to a U.S. citizen. Id. at 1327. The
IJ did not issue a ruling until after the voluntary departure period expired and then denied
her motion, reasoning that Ugokwe had stayed past her voluntary departure period. Id.
116. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
117. See Barroso, 429 F.3d 1195 (decided November 18, 2005); Kanivets, 424 F.3d 330
(decided September 7, 2005); Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d 950 (decided May 17, 2005).
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• • 118interpretation. In Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that voluntary departure was a benefit only conferred on aliens who meet
certain criteria, such as having good moral character; and even then
granted only to those aliens that specifically request such relief.19
Therefore, the court did not view the BIA's interpretation as absurd;
instead, it regarded voluntary departure as a privilege that must be
requested."0 The privilege comes with a price: the alien must forego any
benefit from a motion to reopen, if such a motion is not ruled on by the
time the voluntary departure period expires .
Much like the Azarte court, the Fifth Circuit began by looking directly
122to the language of the INA as amended by the IIRIRA. The court
reasoned that automatically tolling the voluntary departure period would
almost always cause that period to exceed 120 days, in direct conflict with
the limitation of the statute. 123 The Fifth Circuit also found that the
118. Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2006) (contradicting the
Ninth Circuit's finding that the BIA's interpretation to not toll the voluntary departure
period was "'nonsensical"' (quoting Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (9th Cir.
2005))), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007).
119. See id. at 389 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c)); see also supra note 44 and
accompanying text. Mexican citizen Sergio Banda-Ortiz was charged with removability,
being in the country "without being admitted or paroled," in March 2000. Banda-Ortiz,
445 F.3d at 388. He conceded removability but requested a cancellation of his removal,
"claiming that his departure would impose 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship'
on his older son and adoptive parents." Id. Alternately, he requested voluntary
departure. The IJ denied his request for cancellation but granted voluntary departure. Id.
Banda-Ortiz appealed to the BIA, which affirmed the IJ's decision and granted Banda-
Ortiz a thirty-day voluntary departure period. Rather than depart, he then filed a timely
motion to reopen in order to introduce "new evidence of hardship to his family that would
result from his departure." Id. Eventually, after some procedural complications, his
motion was denied because he failed to depart before the expiration of his voluntary
departure period. Id.
120. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389-90 ("Voluntary departure is the result of an agreed
upon exchange of benefits between an alien and the Government."). The court went on to
explain the benefits an alien receives by opting to pursue voluntary departure:
1) the ability to choose his own destination point; 2) the opportunity to put his
affairs in order without fear of being taken into custody; 3) freedom from
extended detention while the government prepares for his removal; 4) avoidance
of the stigma of forced removal; and 5) continued eligibility for an adjustment of
status.
Id. (citing Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004)).
121. Id. at 390 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)).
122. See id. at 389-90; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. This approach is
the standard first step in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1,
8 (2004).
123. See Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390. The court reasoned that because 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(b)(2) provides that voluntary departure must be limited to a period of sixty days,
"[a]utomatic tolling would effectively extend the validity of [the alien's] voluntary
departure period well beyond the sixty days that Congress has authorized." Id.; see also 8
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statute plainly states that an alien who fails to depart during his voluntary
departure period loses his eligibility for the regularization of his
immigration status.14  The Fifth Circuit held that the BIA properly
interpreted the INA to prohibit automatic tolling of the voluntary
departure period when an alien files a motion to reopen. ' However, a
debate existed even within the Fifth Circuit, exemplified by Judge Jerry
Smith's strong dissent in Banda-Ortiz, which reaffirmed the Azarte
logic.
12 6
F. The Fourth Circuit joins the Fifth Circuit - Dekoladenu v. Gonzales
The Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit in June 2006 in Dekoladenu
v. Gonzales.117 Agreeing with the Banda-Ortiz court, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that voluntary departure is a benefit rather than a right.'25 The
court also applied the Fifth Circuit's logic with respect to automatic
tolling, holding that such tolling violates the express language of the
IIRIRA's strict time limits for voluntary departure.'29 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit based its decision on Chevron deference. 30 Because the
C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2007) ("In no event can the total period of time, including any
extension, exceed . . . 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act [8 U.S.C. §
1229c(b)(2)].").
124. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c(d)(1) (West Supp. 2007); see Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390.
125. Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391.
126. Id. at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("It makes little sense why Congress would codify
a right to file a motion to reopen 'within 90 days of the date of entry of a final
administrative order of removal,' § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), if, in a substantial number of cases,
the order of removal itself would result in forfeiture of the motion.").
127. 459 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar.
22, 2007) (No. 06-1285). Christopher Dekoladenu, a citizen of Ghana, applied for asylum
and withholding of removal in June 2000, nearly two years after his six-month visa expired
in 1998. Id. at 502. He was ordered to appear at a removal hearing, and in March 2003 he
asked that the IJ "adjourn and continue or terminate the removal proceedings" because of
various employment applications that were pending. Id. The IJ denied the request but
granted Dekoladenu a voluntary departure date of July 7, 2003. Id. Dekoladenu filed a
timely motion to reopen on that day but the IJ denied the motion and the BIA affirmed.
The Board stated that Dekoladenu no longer had a right to a motion to reopen because he
had failed to depart within his voluntary departure period. Id. at 502-03.
128. Id. at 506 ("Voluntary departure is not a right, but a benefit .... Because
voluntary departure is a privilege that is only available to a subset of removable aliens, it is
neither 'absurd' nor 'nonsensical' to require aliens who wish to reap the benefits of
voluntary departure to give up their right to a resolution of a motion to reopen."); see also
Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389-90.
129. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506-07; see also Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390.
130. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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court concluded the BIA's decision was more than reasonable, it showed
the decision deference.'
The Fourth Circuit also responded to the argument presented in
Azarte that ambiguous deportation statutes should be construed in favor
of aliens.' Because in its view the statute was unambiguous, the court
declined to apply this canon.'33 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the
INA, as amended by the IIRIRA, clearly laid out the function of these
two provisions, including the strict time limits. 3' Based on this belief, the
Fourth Circuit determined that the reasoning of the Azarte line of cases
expressly violated the language of the INA. 3 '
G. The First Circuit Makes the Circuit Split Four to Three -
Chedad v. Gonzales
The First Circuit joined with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in July 2007
when it decided Chedad v. Gonzales.16 The First Circuit closely followed
131. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506-07. The Fourth Circuit also based its decision on
another canon of statutory interpretation, that a specific provision controls a general
provision. Id. at 505. The court held that voluntary departure is more specific and thus
should control the motion to reopen provision. Id. at 505-06. This is true because "[t]he
voluntary departure provision applies to certain removable aliens ... while the motion to
reopen provision applies to all aliens subject to removal." Id. In applying the specific-
controlling-the-general method of statutory construction, the court found that both the
voluntary departure and the motion to reopen provisions continue to have effect, by
making available motions to reopen to aliens granted voluntary departure without making
a specific request for such relief. Id. at 506. Using this method, "the apparent conflict the
Azarte court found between the two statutes disappears." Id.
132. Id. at 507 n.7 ("[T]he Azarte court's reliance on 'the well-established canon of
construction that deportation statutes should be construed in favor of the alien' is
misplaced." (quoting Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1289 (9th Cir. 2005))).
133. Id. at 507; cf Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 2004)
("[T]he twin background principles... [are] a strong presumption favoring judicial review
of administrative decisions and that ambiguities in deportation statutes should be
construed in favor of the alien ....").
134. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 504; see also id. at 507 ("[W]e believe that the statutory
provisions governing motions to reopen and voluntary departure clearly indicate that
filing a motion to reopen does not toll the voluntary departure period.").
135. See id. at 506-07.
136. 497 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2007). Adil Chedad, of Morroco, appeared before an IJ in
May 1998 for removal proceedings for overstaying his six-month nonimmigrant visa, which
had been issued in 1994. Id. at 58-59. He admitted having overstayed, but asked for a
continuance because his wife, a lawful permanent resident, had filed an application for
citizenship on his behalf. Id. at 59. The continuance was granted; however, when Chedad
appeared before an IJ in March 1999, his application for citizenship was still pending. The
IJ denied his request for another continuance and instead granted Chedad voluntary
departure. Id. Chedad appealed this final decision. While his appeal was pending,
Chedad's wife became a U.S. citizen, and Chedad asked the BIA to remand, "citing his
newly minted status as the spouse of a United States citizen, as well as prior approval of
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the reasoning of both Dekoladenu and Banda-Ortiz.37  It ruled that the
voluntary departure period should not be tolled when a motion to reopen
is granted because the applicable statutes and regulations clearly set time
limits on the length of the voluntary departure period.m The First
Circuit, however, conceded that "[t]his may or may not be wise policy,
but it is, we believe, the most plausible construction of the statute.:
39
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHICH THEORY OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION SHOULD PREVAIL?
The split between the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits and the Third,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits is one characterized by
disagreements over statutory interpretation."' Though both sides have
interpreted the same statutes, the results are very different.14 ' The First,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have affirmed the BIA's interpretation of the
proper interplay between the voluntary departure and motion to reopen
provisions, whereas the other four circuits have opposed the BIA's
his 1-130 petition." Id. The BIA affirmed the decision on October 25, 2002, and granted
him thirty days to voluntarily depart. Id. at 59-60.
On November 22, 2002, before his voluntary departure period expired, Chedad filed a
timely motion to reopen based on the new circumstances surrounding his eligibility for
citizenship. Id. at 60. Eventually, the motion was heard by an IJ who determined that
because Chedad had failed to leave the country within his voluntary departure period, he
was ineligible for adjustment of status. The BIA affirmed this decision and Chedad
subsequently appealed to the First Circuit. Id.
137. See id. at 63-64.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 64.
140. Compare id. at 63 (holding that because the IIRIRA "evinc[es] a congressional
intent to make the benefits of voluntary departure available only to aliens who agree to...
leave the country willingly," filing a motion to reopen does not toll the departure
deadline), and Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507 ("[W]e believe that the statutory provisions
governing motions to reopen and voluntary departure clearly indicate that filing a motion
to reopen does not toll the voluntary departure period."), and Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Automatic tolling would effectively extend the validity
of [the] voluntary departure period well beyond the sixty days that Congress has
authorized."), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007), with Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453
F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that the BIA's interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7)
improperly "creates an exception" to the statute's plain language), and Barroso v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that construing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f)
"as applying to a grant of voluntary departure" would produce an impermissibly "'absurd
result[]"' (quoting Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004))), and Kanivets v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that timely filing a motion to
reopen tolls § 1229a(c)(7)'s limitations period until the BIA rules on the motion), and
Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (holding that the
BIA's denial of plaintiff's motion to reopen "solely on the ground that he had overstayed
his voluntary departure period" was an abuse of discretion).
141. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7) (West 2005 & Supp. 2007) (motion to reopen); 8
U.S.C. § 1229c (2000) (voluntary departure).
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stance, relying heavily on the assertion that because the BIA's statutory
construction leads to absurd results, it cannot be upheld.142 A review of
the statutory interpretation methods used by the circuit courts will
illuminate the disagreement among them.
A. The First Canon of Statutory Interpretation: Look to the Text
The first step of statutory interpretation is to look to the language of
the statute to examine its plain meaning. 143 Congress codified each of the
two provisions with strict guidelines for their application to aliens subject
to removal proceedings.'" However, in an apparent oversight, neither
provision discusses its role in relation to the other, despite the fact that
they overlap.4 4 The question thus becomes: are the voluntary departure
and motion to reopen provisions ambiguous with regard to their proper
interrelationship, or is there plain language that leads to a clear result?
146
142. See supra note 139.
143. See Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Leocal v.
Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2004) ("[Olur analysis begins with the language of the statute
.... When interpreting a statute, we must give words their 'ordinary or natural' meaning."
(quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993))).
144. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c. Each alien is limited to one
motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), which must be "filed within 90 days of the
date of entry of a final administrative order of removal," id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The
voluntary departure provision has an extensive list of guidelines, including strict eligibility
criteria, time limits providing that the voluntary departure period cannot exceed 120 days,
and a list of consequences an alien faces if he fails to depart within the granted departure
period. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)-(d).
145. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The regulations implementing these
provisions create further confusion as "[a]ny departure from the United States . . .
occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a
withdrawal of such motion." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2007); see also Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334
("An alien may timely file a petition for reopening, but if the BIA does not decide the
petition within the period for voluntary departure, the alien loses the right to have a
ruling.").
146. Compare Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288-89, with Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506-07. One
of the basic disagreements of the circuit split is whether the language of these two
provisions is ambiguous. The answer to this question greatly affects the interpretation of
the IIRIRA. The Ninth Circuit, in Azarte, found that the voluntary departure provision
and the motion to reopen provision are not ambiguous separately, but that their
interrelationship is ambiguous. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1285-86. The Ninth Circuit cleverly
used this "in some ways ambiguous, in some ways unambiguous" argument to its
advantage. First, the court characterized the provisions as unambiguous when it discussed
whether deference to the BIA was appropriate under Chevron. See id. at 1285 ("The first
step under Chevron is to determine whether the statutory meaning is unambiguous. No
deference to the view of the administrative agency is necessary when 'normal principles of
statutory construction suffice' to determine the statute's meaning.") (citations omitted);
see also supra note 92. Second, the court emphasized that the interplay of the voluntary
departure and motion to reopen provisions was ambiguous, and therefore the canon of
statutory construction that immigration statutes should be construed in favor of aliens
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When looking to the language of the statute for its plain meaning, the
Ninth Circuit in Azarte insisted that it is also necessary to apply the
canon of statutory construction which holds that "courts are generally
obligated to analyze the statute as a whole.' ' 17  The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that when analyzing the INA as a whole, Congress could not
have intended to have the voluntary departure provision control the
motion to reopen provision.148 Therefore, to ensure that both statutes
have force, it is necessary to automatically toll the voluntary departure
period while a motion to reopen is pending.149  It concluded that the
BIA's interpretation "deprives the motion to reopen provision of
meaning,"'"5 and therefore could not be correct. This argument may be
theoretically sound; however, the court avoided interpreting what is in
the text, and instead justified its interpretation by what is not in the plain
language. 5
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have countered the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning by referencing the plain language of the statute. These
courts cite the language of section 1229c(a), which directly states that the
voluntary departure period shall not exceed 120 days. 53 These circuits
argue that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Azarte violates the explicit
time limit imposed in the statute, and therefore the plain language of the
text unambiguously precludes the voluntary departure periods from
being automatically tolled.)
4
applied. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289. The Fourth Circuit responded to the Ninth Circuit's
subtle application of the statutory ambiguity in Dekoladenu. See Dekoladenu v. Gonzales,
459 F.3d 500, 507 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding the "statutory provisions governing motions to
reopen and voluntary departure" unambiguous and therefore granting deference to the
decision of the BIA), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007) (No. 06-
1285).
147. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1287. The court described the purpose of the "Whole Act
Rule" is to give a statute "'such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the
Legislature."' Id. at 1288 (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974)).





151. See id. at 1288-89 ("We find the notion nonsensical that Congress would have
allowed aliens subject to voluntary departure to file motions to reopen but would have
simultaneously precluded the BIA from issuing decisions on those motions.").
152. See Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 57, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2007); Dekoladenu v.
Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S.
Mar. 22, 2007) (No. 06-1285); Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 389-91 (5th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007).
153. See, e.g., Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2000)).
154. See id. at 505; Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389-91. The Fourth Circuit also looked to
the plain language of the text to interpret the interrelationship of these two provisions
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B. Does the BIA's Interpretation Lead to an Absurd Result?
Another important question at the heart of this circuit split is whether
the BIA's interpretation of the voluntary departure and motion to
reopen provisions leads to an absurd result.155 The Ninth Circuit and
those circuits that follow the logic cited in Azarte have found that to not
automatically toll the voluntary departure period when a motion to
reopen is pending leads to an absurd result."' Therefore, these circuitsreasoned that the BIA's interpretation cannot be followed even if it is
while applying the "canon of statutory construction that a specific statutory provision
controls a more general one." Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 505 (quoting Warren v. N.C. Dep't
of Human Res., 65 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1995)). In Dekoladenu, the Fourth Circuit
argued that when this canon is applied, the two provisions retain their meaning, but the
voluntary departure provision controls the motion to reopen because it is applied to a
more specific class of individuals. Id. at 505-06. Although the Fourth Circuit's argument is
convincing, the "specific provision controlling the general" canon appears to have less
applicability than the "statute as a whole" canon, as applied by the Ninth Circuit.
Compare Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288 ("Such an interpretation would effectuate both
statutory provisions. Js and the BIA... would retain the authority Congress intended: to
determine one non-frivolous motion to reopen."), with Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506
("[Our] interpretation gives effect to both provisions. A motion to reopen remains
available to all aliens, but an alien who requests voluntary departure will forfeit his right to
a decision on his motion to reopen if the IJ grants his request."). Therefore, this argument
ultimately is not persuasive. However, the Fourth Circuit's use of this canon supports its
view that the plain language of the statute indicates that these provisions are not
ambiguous in their relationship with each other, and that refusing to toll the voluntary
departure period while a motion to reopen is pending does not lead to "an absurd result."
Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506. The Fourth Circuit argued that the language of these
provisions demands a clear result, especially when this canon of statutory construction is
applied. Id. at 507.
155. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. The "absurd results" argument,
first utilized by the Ninth Circuit in Azarte, has been applied by the other circuits
upholding the Azarte logic to counter the argument made by the Fourth and Fifth Circuits
that the plain language of the text clearly supports the result advocated by the BIA: that
the voluntary departure period should not be tolled while a motion to reopen is pending.
Compare Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1329-31 (11th Cir. 2006), and
Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2005), and Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407
F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288-89, with
Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506, and Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 389-90.
156. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288-89 ("We find the notion nonsensical that Congress would
have allowed aliens subject to voluntary departure to file motions to reopen but would
have simultaneously precluded the BIA from issuing decisions on those motions."). The
"absurd results" principle of statutory construction provides that a statute need not be
interpreted according to its plain meaning if that meaning leads to unintelligent results.
See id.; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("[A]uthoritative
administrative constructions should be given the deference to which they are entitled,
absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt
with.") (emphasis added).
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based on the plain language of the statute.'57 Their argument is sound: if
an interpretation truly does lead to an absurd result, it is likely that
Congress did not intend such a construction.
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have responded to this "absurd
interpretation" argument by again emphasizing that Congress intended
the granting of voluntary departure to be a benefit.59 Therefore, to these
circuits "it is neither 'absurd' nor 'nonsensical' to require aliens who wish
to reap the benefits of voluntary departure to give up their right to a
resolution of a motion to reopen."'0 In addition, an alien must
specifically request voluntary departure. 6' Thus, when an alien makes
such a request he acknowledges that he intends to leave the country
within the granted time period and take advantage of the benefits that go
along with voluntary departure.16 This, it is argued, is not an absurd
result.' 63 The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits' argument, although
arguably less fair, is based on firmer statutory analysis.'4
C. The Circuits' Disagreement Over the Amount of Deference Given to
the BIA's Interpretation
Chevron deference mandates that a court give an agency's
interpretation deference when Congress has selected that agency to
control a specific area of the law. 65 Chevron deference has frequently
been applied to BIA rulings.6 6 BIA decisions that have elements of
statutory interpretation are given deference "when it appears that
157. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288-89. The circuits siding with Azarte agree that the best
way to avoid this "absurdity" is to automatically toll the voluntary departure period when
a motion to reopen is pending. See Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1329-31; Kanivets, 424 F.3d at
334-35; Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 952.
158. Cf Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580.
159. See Chedad v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 57, 63 (2007); Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 505-07;
Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 390-91; see also supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
160. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506.
161. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.25(c) (2007); id. § 1240.26(b)(1)(i)(A); see also Banda-Ortiz,
445 F.3d at 389.
162. See Chedad, 497 F.3d at 63; Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506; Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at
389-90.
163. See sources cited supra note 161.
164. See Rubenstein, supra note 28, at 27-29.
165. See supra note 92 (discussing Chevron deference).
166. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); Nwolise v. U.S. INS, 4
F.3d 306, 309 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[lIt is well established that the legal determinations of the
Board in interpreting the Act are entitled to deference by this court. Indeed, we have
stated that where 'the BIA's interpretation of the statutory section is neither inconsistent
or unjustified, we [will] uphold the Board's construction which, in its estimation, will
better serve the legislative intent and purpose."' (quoting Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645
F.2d 248, 251 (4th Cir. 1981)) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984))).
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Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."'67 Chevron
deference only applies when the plain language of the statute does not
clearly indicate congressional intent.' 68 Therefore, in cases of ambiguity,
a court must accept the agency's interpretation as long as it is reasonable
and "'is based on a permissible construction of the statute,",169 even if
such interpretation is not the best possible one. 7 °
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits reasoned that if, as Azarte holds, the
statute is ambiguous with regard to the interrelationship of the two
provisions, 71 then Chevron deference should apply.172  These courts
contended that if the statute is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the
effect of a motion to reopen on the voluntary departure period, we would
have to defer to the BIA's interpretation of the statutes it administers.,
173
The BIA's interpretation should be followed because it is reasonable
74
and based on a permissible construction of the statute. 175  The BIA's
interpretation is even more reasonable when voluntary departure is
viewed as a benefit conferred on an alien. 7' This logical argument
adheres to the principle of Chevron deference.
77
The Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits maintain that the
Chevron deference principle can not control the BIA's decision because
doing so leads to both unreasonable and absurd results.' In particular,
the Ninth Circuit cited past cases which support "rejecting and affording
167. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
168. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,600 (2004).
169. Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 500, 507 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007)
(No. 06-1285).
170. Fallon, supra note 3, at 1097.
171. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
172. See Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507; Banda-Ortiz v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 387, 389 (5th
Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007).
173. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507.
174. See Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391.
175. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507.
176. See Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 507; Banda-Ortiz, 445 F.3d at 391.
177. See supra note 92. Congress has given the Attorney General the power to decide
whether voluntary departure should be granted. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1), (b)(1) (2000).
The Attorney General makes this decision after the IJ has entered an order granting the
voluntary departure. Id. § 1229c(b)(1). Thus, Congress has given the power to apply, and
therefore interpret, this statute to the DOJ, which implements the statute through the
EOIR. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
178. See Azarte v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1278, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Ugokwe v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2006); Barroso v. Gonzales, 429
F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005); Kanivets v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 330, 334-35 (3d Cir. 2005);
Sidikhouya v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 950, 952 (8th 2005) (per curiam).
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no deference to a legal interpretation by the BIA that 'contravenes the
statute and leads to absurd and wholly unacceptable results.'. 9 In these
circuits' view, the BIA's interpretation contradicts Congress' intention
and therefore should be supplanted with a reading of the statute that
gives effect to both provisions.'80 This is a reasonable position, allowing
courts to overturn the BIA's ruling on the narrow basis that Congress
would not intend to produce a nonsensical result, as applied to these
factual situations. It is questionable, however, whether the circuits'
application of the statutory text proves that the BIA's interpretation
truly is unreasonable and impermissible under the statute, 182 or rather,
that it is simply not the best result. 
83
D. The Ninth Circuit Relies on the Canon of Construction that
Immigration Statutes Should be Construed in Favor of Aliens
The final statutory canon referred to in the circuit court decisions is the
principle that when a deportation statute is ambiguous, it should be
construed in favor of aliens.'8 4 In Azarte, the Ninth Circuit viewed this
canon as mandating that the voluntary departure period be automatically
tolled when a motion to reopen is pending.8 5 The Third, Eighth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits, therefore, would resolve the ambiguities of the
179. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 559 (9th Cir.
2004)); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1980) (reaffirming the rule
that courts must avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results).
180. See Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1288-89 (holding that in order to avoid an untenable
result, both statutes must be given effect by tolling the voluntary departure period); see
also Ugokwe, 453 F.3d at 1330-31 (joining the Azarte line of cases in order to not "ignore"
an entire statutory provision); Kanivets, 424 F.3d at 334-35; Barroso, 429 F.3d at 1207;
Sidikhouya, 407 F.3d at 952.
181. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 515 ("[O]ne of the most frequent justifications courts give for
choosing a particular construction is that the alternative interpretation would produce
'absurd' results ... ").
182. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (holding that if a statute is silent or ambiguous, the court need only determine if a
permissible construction exists).
183. See Fallon, supra note 3, at 1097.
184. Compare Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289 (recognizing the statutory canon of
construction that construes ambiguous deportation statutes in favor of aliens, and finding
such ambiguities in the deportation statute in question), with Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 459
F.3d 500, 507 n.7 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that because there are no ambiguities in the
statute, it need not be construed in favor of the alien), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W.
3530 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007) (No. 06-1285). The Supreme Court has recognized that the
severe impact of deportation warrants construing deportation statutes in favor of aliens.
See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1948) (holding that "because deportation is
a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile," the narrowest
reading possible will be used in an attempt to preserve the alien's freedom).
185. Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289.
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INA by giving aliens an actual opportunity for relief.186 The Fourth
Circuit, however, has responded by referring back to its previous
assertion that this statute is not in fact ambiguous; therefore, this
particular canon of statutory construction does not apply.
187
III. How SHOULD THIS CIRCUIT SPLIT BE RESOLVED?:
AN AMENDMENT, A SUPREME COURT DECISION, OR AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RULE?
A. An Amendment to Clarify the Proper Interrelationship
of the Two Provisions
The existence of this circuit split indicates that something needs to be
done in order to ensure uniformity across the American judicial system.
There are a few different ways that the conflict between the motion to
reopen and the voluntary departure provisions can be resolved. First, to
clarify its intent, Congress could pass an amendment to the INA
explaining the proper interrelationship of the two provisions.118 A well
written amendment would be effective because it would provide both the
courts and affected aliens (or their lawyers) with clear, unambiguous
language dictating the proper result."' The problems, however, withrelying on an amendment are that the process for passing such an
186. Ugokwe v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 453 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2006).
187. Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506-07 & n.7. Compare Azarte, 394 F.3d at 1289
(determining that the two statutory provisions are incompatible with one another, unless
the court's construction is accepted), with Dekoladenu, 459 F.3d at 506-07 (holding that
"the more specific voluntary departure provision governs in those limited situations in
which it applies," thus avoiding any conflict between the two provisions).
188. See Tapley, supra note 49, at 227-28 (proposing an amendment to the IIRIRA).
189. Several immigration bills have been introduced in Congress that contain language
under which the interplay between voluntary departure and the motion to reopen
provision would be directly affected by an amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1229c, the voluntary
departure provision. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th
Cong. § 211; Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of
2005, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 208. The substantive provision of one proposal states:
Except as expressly agreed to by the Secretary in writing in the exercise of the
Secretary's discretion before the expiration of the period allowed for voluntary
departure, no motion, appeal, application, petition, or petition for review shall
affect, reinstate, enjoin, delay, stay, or toll the alien's obligation to depart from
the United States during the period agreed to by the alien and the Secretary.
S. 2611, § 211(c)(5) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 4437, § 208(b)(4) (providing language
nearly identical to that of the Senate bill). Neither bill has passed, but each would codify
the First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits' opinions by stating that the voluntary departure
period should never be delayed, stayed or tolled on account of a motion. This result seems
unfair to aliens who have been granted their request for voluntary departure and
subsequently experience new circumstances which legitimately should affect their status in
the United States.
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amendment is extensive and varying interpretations are always possible
when it comes to statutory language. On a substantive level, although
tolling the voluntary departure period would be more fair for those aliens
that have valid reasons for requesting a motion to reopen, it also
provides an incentive for aliens who are granted voluntary departure to
file a meritless motion in order to extend their stay in the United States
and still retain the benefits of departing voluntarily. 9° For these reasons,
an amendment that would toll the voluntary departure period while a
motion to reopen is pending is not the best course of action at this time,
especially in light of the need for an immediate solution.
B. Supreme Court Decision to Resolve This Circuit Split
In September 2007, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Dada v.
Mukasey, a case that was appealed from the Fifth Circuit.' 9'
Procedurally, the facts of this case are almost identical to the others
discussed in this article with one notable exception: the petitioner in
Dada specifically requested a withdrawal of his voluntary departure
before filing the motion to reopen.' 92 The Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to resolve the circuit split with its decision in the Dada case.
Based on oral arguments it seems likely the Court will rule against the
Third, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' interpretation that the
voluntary departure period should be automatically tolled when a motion
to reopen is requested. 93 As the Supreme Court's questioning indicates,
this result is too clearly contrary to the plain language of the statute.'9
Therefore it is unlikely that a Supreme Court decision will be able to
both resolve this circuit split and provide the fairest result for aliens.
190. Brief for the Respondent at 33-34, Dada v. Mukasey, No. 06-1181 (U.S. Dec. 3,
2007).
191. Dada v. Keisler, 128 S. Ct. 36 (2007). Dada, like most of the cases discussed in
this article, dealt with an alien who was granted voluntary departure and then filed a
motion to reopen. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 10-11. Dada stayed
past his voluntary departure period in order to await his hearing on the motion to reopen,
but like other aliens before him, the BIA ruled that since he had stayed past the voluntary
departure period, he was no longer entitled to the relief requested in his motion. Id. at 11.
Dada appealed the BIA's decision to the Fifth Circuit, which followed the reasoning laid
out in Banda-Ortiz, upheld the BIA's decision, and denied Dada's appeal in a one page
unpublished opinion. Dada v. Gonzales, 207 F. App'x 425 (5th Cir. 2006).
192. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 11.
193. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Dada, No. 06-1181 (providing questions
and responses by Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Stevens, which indicate that they are not
comfortable contradicting the plain language of the IIRIRA); see also id. at 55-57
(revealing that that the focus of the argument is shifting from the "automatic tolling"
solution to adopting the regulation proposed by the DOJ).
194. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193, at 19-20.
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However, Dada may have a chance at succeeding on another related
ground. After oral arguments, the Court directed the parties to provide
supplemental briefs on the issue of whether or not an alien should be
allowed to withdraw his grant of voluntary departure.'9 If the Court
decides that such a voluntary withdrawal is permissible, then in effect this
will provide aliens with a way to retain their right to a motion to reopen
even after being granted voluntary departure. However, a Court
decision based on that ground alone will not resolve the issue that existed
in so many of the cases discussed in this article: specifically where an
alien does not request to withdraw of his grant of voluntary departure.
C. A Regulation from the Department of Justice that
Resolves the Circuit Split
The third possibility for resolving this circuit split is an administrative
regulation that clarifies the proper interplay of the voluntary departure
and motion to reopen provisions. On November 30, 2007, the DOJ
proposed such a regulation. 96 In the proposed regulation the grant of
voluntary departure would automatically terminate if a motion to reopen
is filed. 97 Such a rule would resolve the circuit split as well as provide a
fair result for immigrants who are lawfully entitled to this motion to
reopen. This proposed regulation does not contradict the plain language
of the statute because there is no mention of terminating the grant of
voluntary departure in the IIRIRA . 9  Also, an agency's interpretation of
a statute is given such high deference' 99 that a regulation is a useful tool
to clear up this type of disagreement over statutory language. For these
reasons, this proposed regulation is the best solution to resolving this
circuit split while providing the most equitable outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that a circuit split exists indicates that the INA, as amended
by the IIRIRA, does not clearly indicate the proper interrelationship
between the voluntary departure and the motion to reopen provisions.
The language of the two provisions, specifically the strict voluntary
195. Dada v. Mukasey, No. 06-1181, 2008 WL 370895, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2008)
(directing the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing "[w]hether an alien who has
been granted voluntary departure and has filed a timely motion to reopen should be
permitted to withdraw the request for voluntary departure prior to the expiration of the
departure period").
196. Voluntary Departure: Effect of a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider or a Petition
for Review, 72 Fed. Reg. 67674 (proposed Nov. 30, 2007).
197. Id. at 67674; see also supra note 54.
198. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229c (West 2005 & Supp. 2007).
199. See supra note 92 (discussing Chevron deference).
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departure time limit, leads to one result supported by three circuits.
However, fairness considerations, analyzing the statute as a whole, and
giving each provision equal effect leads to a different result, which is
supported by four circuits. Therefore the DOJ's proposed regulation,
automatically terminating the grant of voluntary departure when a
motion to reopen is filed, provides a result that is both in line with
current statutory language and ensures that aliens have access to all of
their statutorily given rights.
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